“Introduction” to \u3ci\u3eModeling Complex Systems: Volume 52 of the Nebraska Symposium on Motivation\u3c/i\u3e by Shuart, Bill et al.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Faculty Publications, Department of Psychology Psychology, Department of 
2007 
“Introduction” to Modeling Complex Systems: Volume 52 of the 
Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 
Bill Shuart 
Madonna Rehabilitation Hospital, Lincoln, NE 
William D. Spaulding 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, wspaulding1@unl.edu 
Jeffrey Poland 
Rhode Island School of Design /Brown University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/psychfacpub 
 Part of the Psychiatry and Psychology Commons 
Shuart, Bill; Spaulding, William D.; and Poland, Jeffrey, "“Introduction” to Modeling Complex Systems: 
Volume 52 of the Nebraska Symposium on Motivation" (2007). Faculty Publications, Department of 
Psychology. 355. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/psychfacpub/355 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology, Department of at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications, 
Department of Psychology by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
Bill Shuart, Madonna Rehabilitation Hospital, Lincoln, NE 
William D. Spaulding, University of Nebraska–Lincoln 
Jeffrey Poland, Rhode Island School of Design /Brown University 
 
“Introduction” to Modeling Complex Systems: Volume 52 of 
the Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, ed. Richard 
Dienstbier, Bill Shuart, William D. Spaulding, and Jeffrey 
Poland. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. 
 
Copyright © 2007 University of Nebraska Press.  
Used by permission. 
 
 
 
  
Introduction 
Bill Shuart, 
Will Spaulding, 
and Jeffrey Poland 
Madonna Rehabilitation Hospital; 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln; 
Rhode Island School of Design / 
Brown University 
Capturing the complexity of human behavior has been a recurring 
theme in the Nebraska Symposium on Motivation: 
We expect behavior to be patterned or integrated, and to make 
biological sense; and so patterning and biological utility are what 
we see. And of course what we see is actually there-behavior in 
general is not chaotic; it is organized. (Nissen, 1954, p. 314) 
When fundamental psychologists do make excursions into the 
human motivational world ... it is rare that they survey the 
requirements for theory or pre-theory by intensive descriptive 
analysis of behavior related to such motives as produced by 
concrete human beings. More remote still is the chance that 
anyone will select for illustration, let alone analysis, behavior 
or experience relevant to man in his most characteristically 
human performances: man as he creates or loves or plays or 
responds to the aesthetic surfaces of the human and natural 
environment. Such matters are threateningly complex. (Koch, 
1956, pp. 64-65) 
I have tried, first, to show that it is possible to formulate a 
meaningful theory of complex motivation by analyzing the 
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sorts of variables involved, together with their interactions. 
I have sought, second, to show that we possess, now, many 
sound and useful concepts and techniques to translate these 
complexities into productive experimental research. I suppose 
the moral is: be not afraid of complexity. If motivation is indeed 
complex, then let us find the means to cope with it. (Vinacke, 
1962, pp. 42-43) 
Through the representation of a few very simple psychological 
concepts, in a rudimentary mathematical way, a good deal of 
complexity can be generated .... Let us now proceed to gener-
ate complexity from simplicity. (Burke, 1966, pp. 49-50) 
Although disorder may be experienced and expressed in highly 
patterned processes of human activity, it is diverse, individu-
ally unique, and systemic; we shall advance in our attempts 
at conceptualization and classification only as we are willing 
to embrace the limits of symbol systems to capture human 
uniqueness and the ultimate ineffability of complex system dy-
namics. (Mahoney, in this volume, pp. 265-266) 
The contributions to this volume of the Symposium describe con-
temporary approaches to the modeling of complex psychological 
and behavioral processes, ranging from molecular to molar phenom-
ena. Although the contributions reflect a range of theoretical and 
epistemic perspectives, they all explicitly or implicitly incorporate 
complex frameworks of dynamic, system-like relations involving 
perception, learning, concept formation, emotion, motivation, inten-
tion, behavior, and the social context in which behavior occurs. 
One special feature of all the contributions from this particularly 
distinguished group of theorist-practitioners is an emphasis on prac-
tical applications of the conceptual frameworks in which they work. 
This reflects an important idea in the zeitgeist of the contemporary 
scientific community, that of translational research. Translational re-
search is a process of translating the principles and truths that 
emerge from basic science into practical applications. The complex-
ity of the processes captured in the contributors' models enhances 
the models' applicability to the complexities of clinical practice, in-
dustry, and education. To consolidate the relevance of application 
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and translational research, this volume ends with a volume editors' 
postscript, describing a practical model for the complex processes of 
rehabilitation, as manifest in rehabilitation services currently evolv-
ing in Nebraska. 
Translational research demands, not just practical application, 
but continuity with theory and basic science. This converges with 
the historic role of the Nebraska Symposium as a prominent (and 
now the oldest sustained) forum for psychological theory. All the 
contributions in this volume emphasize the theoretical basis of ap-
plication and the necessity of logical and conceptual continuity in 
understanding complex processes. 
In the first contribution Richard W. J. Neufeld discusses the ad-
vantages of formal mathematical theory for illuminating relations 
between variables as they interact in experimental science. He ap-
plies these advantages to the clinical practice of assessing cognitive 
impairments. Decrying a continuing overreliance in much psycho-
logical research on statistical analyses associated with Fisher and 
Pearson, Dr. Neufeld asserts that formal mathematical modeling of 
cognitive processes will, ultimately, lead to greater theoretical clarity 
about normal and abnormal cognition and better clinical-assessment 
techniques. It is noteworthy that, while the tradition of mathematical 
modeling in psychology has a long and honored past, the increasing 
availability of powerful computational tools (e.g., computers and 
analytic software) supports the kind of sophisticated modeling in 
the hospital or clinic that was impractical in earlier decades. 
At a more general level, Dr. Neufeld characterizes his approach 
as a novel form of construct validity, one based on the inherent 
mathematical properties of the cognitive processes he studies. In this 
sense his contribution is a sophisticated exemplar of the use of com-
plex modeling to achieve traditional theoretical goals of experimen-
tal and clinical psychology, as articulated by such historical figures 
as Lee Cronbach and Paul Meehl. 
In the next contribution, Wolfgang Tschacher and Zeno Kupper 
provide a synthesis of dynamic systems theory and current cogni-
tive science. Inspired by the historic role of Gestalt psychology in 
the evolution of cognitive science, their discussion invites us into the 
heart of psychology's theoretical legacy. Drs. Tschacher and Kupper 
then apply their perspective and methods to the complex realm of 
psychopathology. They present data sets and analyses from recent 
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research with people diagnosed with schizophrenia and demonstrate 
the importance of tracking individuals with multiple measurements 
over time in order to detect oscillations or trajectories in rehabilita-
tion and recovery that would be missed in the typical cross-sectional 
approach. Using a time-series analysis, they identify unique patterns 
or dimensions of intrasubject characteristics that have complex but 
meaningful interrelations. Returning to theoretical principles, they 
show how complex, dynamic formulations can be translated into 
useful clinical instruments and methods. Finally, in a tribute to the 
Nebraska Symposium's historic focus, their contribution culminates 
with a characterization of motivation as identical to the ongoing ac-
tion of complex human cognitive processes operating to order and 
simplify a complex world. 
A second exemplar of complex modeling to achieve traditional 
goals is provided by Suzanne P. Lajoie. Dr. Lajoie uses theoretically 
grounded performance modeling in the development of computer-
based "intelligent" tutoring systems designed to help learners mas-
ter the complexities of real-world endeavors. Learning how experts 
go about problem solving and decision making through "cognitive-
task analysis" is an important aspect in the process of developing an 
effective tutoring system. Dr. Lajoie highlights the importance of dis-
cerning experts' relevant "dimensions of expertise" (e.g., self-mon-
itoring), as expressed in a specific context, in developing effective 
models. She also emphasizes the importance of other variables, e.g., 
emotional, motivational, and social, and she describes strategies for 
determining what to model, whom or what should serve as the model, 
and how to model the content and/or process. She then translates 
these principles into design considerations for effective educational 
technology. 
The next contribution extends application of complex model-
ing from education to knowledge management. Mark A. Musen 
discusses past and current efforts to develop computer applications 
to support decision making and data representation in health care. 
Dr. Musen's theory base is not psychology or neuroscience but ar-
tificial intelligence. His technology is the technology of computer 
engineering. Nevertheless, he envisions a future role for psychol-
ogy in the development of artificially intelligent systems to manage 
our already enormous and rapidly expanding knowledge base. It 
is noteworthy in this regard that psychology has drawn from engi-
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neering as much as vice versa, from radar-inspired signal detection 
models of perception to band-filter models of attention to computer 
models of executive cognition. Herbert Simon, in his 1994 Nebraska 
Symposium on Motivation contribution, cited artificial intelligence 
as a promising model for human cognition. The impact of complex 
models for knowledge management may be in psychology's future 
rather than its past. 
In the next contribution, Eduardo Salas, Kevin C. Stagl, C. Shawn 
Burke, and Gerald F. Goodwin scrutinize complex processes associ-
ated with small groups of people brought together for common pur-
poses. They advance "the science of teams" by providing a detailed 
review of representative models of team performance in organiza-
tions and other naturalistic settings generated over the past quarter 
century. In their review, Drs. Salas, Stagl, Burke, and Goodwin find 
the invocation of input-process-output (IPO) models, consonant with 
the "general systems" framework that has influenced many areas 
in the social sciences during the past several decades, to be a key 
commonality among these models. There is greater diversity among 
models with respect to emphasis on internal team processes versus 
greater attention to the influence of external, contextual factors. The 
authors conclude that both influences are important and that, conse-
quently, more sophisticated modeling techniques are needed to suc-
cessfully deal with the resulting dynamic complexity, particularly in 
naturalistic settings. 
Drs. Salas, Stagl, Burke, and Goodwin then turn to a description 
and elaboration of a new and unique multilevel integrative frame-
work for understanding team functioning. This new model is dis-
tinctive in the importance that it attaches to individual team mem-
bers' cognition as an important moderating variable as well as group 
decision making, shared mental models, and external factors. 
Michael J. Mahoney's contribution is a nuanced interlacing of 
several kinds of "models," including verbal metaphor, narrative, 
photography, and poetry. Dr. Mahoney discuses various perspec-
tives on "complexity" theory and its precursors in philosophy and 
science, including current theoretical frameworks such as dynamic 
systems theory, complexity studies, and chaos theory, placing them 
in the context of the history of ideas. He describes and elaborates on 
constructivism, an integrative framework and family of theories. Dr. 
Mahoney'S contribution includes two appendices. The first provides 
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a synopsis of important aspects of human change from the perspec-
tive of constructivism. The second provides rich and provocative 
perspectives for incorporation in the practice of counseling, psycho-
therapy, coaching, and other educational pursuits. 
Complexity, Systems, and the Nebraska Symposium on 
Motivation: A Brief History of Ideas 
The perspectives reflected in this volume are exemplars of an evolv-
ing set of conceptual frameworks that influenced thinking in many 
areas of science during the second half of the 20th century. These 
frameworks are most generally associated with general systems theory, 
and addressing complexity is one of their key common features. 
Having recently celebrated a half century of the Nebraska Sym-
posium on Motivation, as this volume's editors we saw a useful pur-
pose in reviewing the more than 300 individual contributions that 
constitute the previous volumes, to identify ideas that anticipate or 
shape the approaches to complexity that we find in contemporary 
work. We found a richness of such ideas, so many that only a few 
can be highlighted here. The remainder of our introduction to this 
volume is a review of five especially resonant contributions from 
volumes past: Heider (1960), Walker (1964), Leeper (1965), New-
comb (1953), and Barker (1960). We selected contributions that, in 
addition to showing the nascent ideas about complexity and systems 
theory discussed in this volume's contributions, have clear relevance 
to practical application and translational research and especially to 
our own particular interests in physical medicine and psychiatric re-
habilitation. 
One common characteristic of systems theories is an organiza-
tional scheme that orders specific mechanisms and processes accord-
ing to their respective complexity. Two terms from classic learning 
theory, molar and molecular, serve to define the poles of these schemes. 
Processes and mechanisms are molar rather than molecular to the 
degree that they represent the integrated interaction of multiple 
components. Psychology itself reflects this type of ordering, ranging 
as it does from theories of neuronal activity to neuropsychology to 
the psychology of social cognition and interpersonal behavior. The 
historical Nebraska Symposium contributions reviewed here follow 
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a molecular to molar rather than a chronological sequence. Interest-
ingly, contributions from common theoretical perspectives can differ 
with respect to the molecular-molar dimension. Heider (1960) and 
Barker (1960) integrate classic Gestalt principles with subsequent 
theories, but Heider addresses comparatively molecular expressions 
of key processes, while Barker is at the other end of the continuum, 
addressing "spontaneous" organizational processes at the level of 
a human community. Other contributions to be reviewed address 
system organizational processes at the cognitive level (Walker, 1964), 
the emotional level (Leeper, 1965), and at the social/interpersonal 
level (Newcomb, 1953). 
We have included extended excerpts from the original contri-
butions, in an effort to preserve the style and tone of the original 
presentation. Also, we hope to provide enough of the language in 
sufficient detail for readers to draw their own conclusions about the 
relation of the historic ideas to those of the present volume. How-
ever, these passages cannot fully convey the logic or the eloquence 
of the source materials. The reader is encouraged to consult the full 
chapters in areas of particular interest. 
Fritz Heider (1960) 
Many Symposium contributions have included Gestalt psychology 
frameworks offering concepts and models that resonate with con-
temporary perspectives (e.g., self-organizing systems) that, in many 
cases, evolved from earlier, traditional Gestalt investigators. An ex-
emplary illustration is Fritz Heider's "The Gestalt theory of motiva-
tion" (1960). 
Heider's work has been more influential on certain theorists than 
the relative paucity of scientific citations would indicate. George S. 
Klein, then editor of the journal Psychological Issues (itself representative 
of the rise of interest in ego functioning in the psychoanalytic literature 
the 1940s and 1950s), provides a brief preface to a set of selected pa-
pers published as Fritz Heider's monograph On Perception, Event Struc-
ture, and the Psychological Environment (1959). In addition to describing 
Heider's unique viewpoint, Klein's comments highlight important as-
pects of the view of rehabilitation and the notion of participation as an 
important goal of rehabilitation (World Health Organization, 2001). The 
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ideas presented have direct relevance to current models of rehabilita-
tion and crucial aspects of participation and quality of life, each inti-
mately associated with the behavior settings available to the individual, 
the quality of his or her social networks, and other variables that will be 
discussed in the final section of this introduction. 
According to Klein (1959): "Fritz Heider's work ... has had over 
the years a significant, if relatively unobtrusive, impact on some of 
the most important theorists of our time, notably Kurt Koffka, Kurt 
Lewin, and Egon Brunswik. More recently, Heider's influence has 
been detectable in perception theory, for example, in the work of 
James Gibson. Still, his writings cannot be called 'popular'" (p. v). 
Klein continues: 
Heider's emphasis on the "macrophysics" of things (in contrast 
to the reductionist emphasis on microphysics), the important 
distinction he develops between those parts of the environ-
ment which mediate ("medium") and those which are medi-
ated ("thing"), his analysis of how we may distinguish behav-
ioral events attributable to the structure of the environment and 
those attributable to the structure of the perceptual system-all 
of these merit close study .... 
Throughout the papers the composition of a "unit"-
whether spatial, temporal, or causal-is of central importance 
to Heider's distinction between "thing" and "medium." The 
defining properties of a "unit," therefore, come in for extended 
and penetrating analysis .... 
Heider has made [an attempt] to penetrate the essential na-
ture of the concept of structure. The general macrostructures 
which he describes may apply to their subjective counterparts 
in ego organization .... 
A unique feature of Heider's approach is his attempt to 
fathom environmental structure not from the response side-
from the inside outward, as it were, as is common in psy-
chological theories-but from the outside inward, that is, by 
specifying the architectural rules of the extrapersonal world of 
physical object and event units. The result, then, is an extraor-
dinarily fresh confrontation of the external structures which 
are assumed but never specified in psychoanalytic notions of 
reality testing and adaptation. (p. vii) 
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In his Symposium contribution Heider provides an overview 
of four "thought models or schemata" characterizing the Gestalt 
tradition at the time. Heider terms the initial model the classic Ge-
stalt theory. The model is based on the work of investigators such 
as Wertheimer, Kohler, and Koffka. Describing this model, Heider 
highlights a number of aspects of this perspective that bring to mind 
such concepts as patterning and perceptual organizing processes that 
seem quite consistent with concepts used today. Heider begins by 
emphasizing the Gestalt concept of good figure, advanced by Wert-
heimer, who applied it to visual processing: 
This principle states that the perceived figure tends to be as 
good as the stimulus pattern will allow, or as Koffka says: "Psy-
chological organization will always be as 'good' as the prevail-
ing conditions allow. In this definition, 'good' is undefined. It 
embraces such properties as regularity, symmetry, simplicity 
and others .... " For instance, slight irregularities in the shape 
of visual forms are usually not noticed. Kohler gives the follow-
ing example: Faces of people usually appear to us symmetrical, 
in spite of the fact that they are rarely objectively symmetrical. 
We may notice this irregularity in another person's face when 
we look at his mirror image; but ordinarily we don't see it. 
Kohler has called attention to the fact that a tendency to-
wards simplicity can also be observed in physical systems, as, 
for instance, Ernst Mach has pointed out. Kohler gives many 
examples in his book on Physical Gestalten [1924] .... 
Let us recapitulate: Wertheimer observed the tendency 
toward good form with percepts; Kohler then related this ob-
servation to a similar tendency found in physical systems. Of 
course the same tendency is then assumed to rule the process 
in the physiological brain field. Since isomorphism is assumed, 
all this fits very well together. 
The thought model is one of a complex process with many 
part events which interact in such a way that a certain end-
state is reached, an end-state which is in some way distin-
guished, and which has characteristics the other possible states 
do not have; as long as this end-state is not reached something 
will happen. On the other hand, when it is reached, the pro-
cess attains an equilibrium and nothing more will happen. 
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Furthermore, the end-state will come about regardless of what 
the beginning state of the system is: thus one can talk about a 
tendency, which implies direction, a reaching of the same end-
state by different routes. (Heider, 1960, pp. 145-146) 
Heider follows his discussion of Kohler's ideas with a perspec-
tive from Kurt Koffka: 
It is not surprising that Gestalt psychologists have applied this 
same thought model to behavior. For instance, Koffka does so 
in his book on The Growth of the Mind, which first appeared in 
1921. I should mention that Koffka uses the term "closure" for 
the distinguished end-state, a closed figure being a better figure 
than an open one. Tendency to closure is therefore only another 
name for tendency toward simplicity, or goodness of figure. 
This is what Koffka says (Koffka, 1925, p. 103): 
... The characteristics of closure ... belong not merely 
to the phenomena themselves, but likewise to the behav-
ior taken as a whole, including all reactions made to the 
environment. Instinctive activity then becomes an objec-
tive mode of behavior analogous to such phenomena as 
rhythm, melody, and figure . 
. . . He [Kohler] calls the state toward which the processes 
in the organism are directed a "standard state." It has to be dis-
tinguished from the state of equilibrium (Kohler, 1938, p. 325), 
and he describes it as follows (Kohler, 1938, p. 303): 
The essential characteristic of regulation is an invariance 
of direction. Whatever initial configuration may obtain in 
those systems when we begin to observe them-if we ob-
serve long enough their inner displacements or transfor-
mations will always be found to bring them nearer to a 
standard status. The word "standard" points here to the 
fact that the final status is independent of the initial con-
figuration . 
. . . Essentially ... the thought model of a system tending 
towards a standard state is applied to directed action, and this 
model had its origin in the principle of good figure. However, 
... when we try to find out how it is carried out, we see that 
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two steps are necessary for the transition from the phenomena 
of the visual field to action. 
First, we have to take into account not merely perceptual 
appearances but a space in which behavior occurs; and sec-
ondly, we have to consider the objective environment, and the 
way the organism effects changes in it. 
... Thus we have to substitute for the visual field what 
Koffka called the behavioral field and Lewin the life space. 
This behavioral field is conceived of as having similarities with 
the visual field. It also is a system containing a great number 
of part processes which interact, it exhibits forces and tensions, 
and tends to arrange itself in such a way that a distinguished 
end-state is reached. This distinguished end-state, in some way 
comparable to the simple figure, is the state of the person who 
has reached the goal in his life space. Now, this life space or be-
havioral field is a concept which involves many difficulties and 
unsuspected depths and snares .... I can only say that in a first 
approximation, which, however, is not entirely correct, one can 
conceive of it as representing the environment of the person as 
the person himself experiences it-and it is in some way related 
to the brain field, to physical processes going on in the brain. 
The Gestalt psychologist would characterize this relation as one 
of isomorphism, i.e., of structural similarity. This is the first step 
we have to accept when we apply the principle of good form to 
activity: namely, the step from perceptual to behavioral field. 
The second step requires a more extensive consideration. So 
far we have only considered processes which are "inside" the 
organism in some way, which are "encapsulated," as Brunswik 
says. How is it possible that they produce effects outside the or-
ganism, in his physical environment? We assume that this be-
havioral field changes in the direction of a distinguished state, 
maybe a state of minimal tension, i.e., the state of the person 
being at the goal. But ... we have to understand how the ten-
sion in the behavioral field makes the person reach the goal in 
reality. (Heider, 1960, pp. 147-149) 
He later continues: 
In action, not only a part of the organism, but the whole organ-
ism is involved .... The idea of the feedback or circular process 
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can be applied also in this case: as long as the person has not 
yet reached the goal, there is a tension in the behavioral field; 
this tension is communicated to the executive system, which 
changes the relation between organism and objective environ-
ment in such a way that the goal is reached; via perception this 
objective state is communicated to the behavioral field; and 
thus the tension in this field is removed. I have used the term 
"feedback" to characterize this process. However, one has to 
keep in mind that this circular process is not a simple feedback 
process. What distinguishes the circular process of Gestalt the-
ory from simple feedback is the interpolation of the behavioral 
field with its tendency towards a distinguished state [emphasis 
added]. (p. 150) 
Heider goes on to describe two models advanced by Kurt 
Lewin-the person model and the environment model, together consti-
tuting what Heider terms Lewin's spatialized psychology. He notes the 
move from the perceptual sphere to the behavioral realm in Koffka's 
work and what Lewin terms the life space. Heider's discussion of 
Lewin's concepts is thought provoking, and the reader is encour-
aged to review those concepts in the source material. 
Heider then offers a relatively brief summary of his own recent 
theorizing, describing what he calls his balance theory, which he feels 
answers some questions left inadequately treated by the classic Ge-
stalt theories he has summarized: 
This theory of balance deals mainly with configurations con-
sisting of a number of entities between which exist certain re-
lations. The entities can be persons-the own person or other 
persons-and other entities, as for instance, things, situations, 
or groups. The relations considered are mainly of two sorts: on 
the one hand attitudes of liking or disliking, and on the other 
hand unit relations of belonging. The main idea is that certain 
of these configurations are preferred, and that, if circumstances 
allow, they will be realized by the person either in such a men-
tal reorganization as wishful thinking, or in an actual change 
through action .... 
In recent times a number of theories have been proposed 
which are similar to the one just outlined. I remind you, for 
instance, of Newcomb's (1953) discussion of processes of com-
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munication [see below] .... These conceptions, symmetry, con-
sonance, balance, and simplicity, are, of course, implied in that 
idea with which Gestalt theory started and which always was 
central to it, namely, the idea of a 'good' figure. We therefore 
have returned to the model we considered first. This model im-
plies a number of different entities with certain properties and 
standing in certain relations, which make up a constellation of 
factors tending toward a standard state. 
The properties of these configurations which determine 
their meaning and their fate are whole-qualities. Consonance 
or simplicity of the structure cannot be derived from the prop-
erties of the parts ... 
If we study the p-o-x system! which is composed of the own 
person (p), another person (0), and an impersonal entity (x), 
then we find that the state of balance depends on the attitudes 
of p toward 0 or x. That is, the attitudes toward the parts of the 
configuration, and the relation of these attitudes to each other 
enter as significant factors, and determine the attitude toward 
the whole configuration .... 
Thus, we are able to specify more exactly the conditions of goal 
selection, at least in some cases. The goal is not taken to be an lmana-
lyzed entity which in some way acquired valence, but is derived from 
the properties of the structure [emphasis added] . 
. . . [The] difference between Lewinian theory and balance 
theory [is] in regard to the role structure plays. In Lewin's en-
vironment model ... structure is not intimately connected with 
the conditions of tendencies, nor with their effects. Structure 
helps us to derive the direction toward means from direction 
toward goal; but it does not help us to derive the direction to 
the goal. ... 
. . . Thus we see that in these [Lewin's] models the dynamic 
factors are not very closely linked with structure. Neither do 
the properties of the structure imply forces, nor do the forces 
affect the structure in a specifiable way. 
In the balance model the dynamic factors are intimately 
connected with the structure. The dynamic factors arise out of 
definable structural characteristics and the forces toward the 
standard state tend to change the structure in definite direc-
tions. 
xxii 
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... [Unlike Lewin's models], in the balance model struc-
ture in a state of equilibrium is definably different from one in 
a state of disequilibrium, and all the parts of the structure are 
relevant to this difference, not only the relation between two 
parts, person and goal. (Heider, 1960, pp. 167-170) 
Edward L. Walker (1964) 
Edward Walker's contribution to the 1964 Symposium, entitled 
"Psychological complexity as a basis for a theory of motivation and 
choice," is generally congruent with Heider's (1960) views, though 
the terminology employed by these scholars and the associated re-
search traditions from which they come are quite different. Walker 
(1964) provides a concrete example of model building as well as an 
interesting perspective on the concept of complexity and mechanisms 
that contribute to the organization and self-regulation of behavior at 
the level of the organism. Also, as with Heider's view, mechanisms 
of perception, cognition, learning, adaptation, and motivation are all 
seen as quite interdependent and quite closely related to environ-
mental stimulus context. 
Walker states at the outset: 
This paper is an attempt to state what J believe to be the most 
basic questions of behavior theory, to elaborate the concept of 
psychological complexity as a potentially unifying concept, and 
to test its clarifying contributions with respect to some critical 
problems of behavior theory. 
The three basic questions of behavior theory are ... 
1. What is the mechanism that terminates an event? 
2. What are the determinants of the next event? 
3. What is the fate of an event after it is terminated? (Walker, 
1964, pp. 48-49) 
He follows precedent in setting the temporal length of a psychologi-
cal event at 0.5 seconds. Then he asks: 
When an event is terminated, what are the determinants of the 
next event? A great many subareas of psychology are devoted 
to an effort to discover and quantify the determinants of choice 
behavior .... "Habit," "motive," "subjective probability," "util-
xxiii 
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ity/' "set," "attitude," and "trait," along with many other con-
cepts in psychology, are reducible to names of intervening vari-
ables or theoretical constructs, each related to different sets of 
operations, but all, ultimately, determiners of choice behavior. 
It will be the argument of this paper that the concept of 
psychological complexity can be used to account for the ter-
mination of psychological events, and the choice of the next 
event over a wide range of traditional concepts of determiners 
of choice. Thus, the concept of psychological complexity can be 
useful in answering the first two of the three basic questions. 
Psychological complexity can also be used to account for many 
of the phenomena associated with the trace of a past event, but 
this third basic question or problem is beyond the scope of the 
present paper. (pp. 51-52) 
Under the subheading "Psychological Complexity Theory," 
Walker asserts: 
The major distinction that must be made is between "stimulus 
complexity" on the one hand and "psychological complexity" 
on the other. The first is a characteristic of the external stim-
ulus, more or less independent of the individual organism. 
Psychological complexity is a characteristic of the event itself, 
the organism's response. Psychological complexity and neural 
process complexity will be assumed to be completely isomor-
phic. (Walker, 1964, pp. 52-53) 
In the context of a basic definition of terms, he turns to an elabora-
tion of his concept of psychological complexity: 
Psychological complexity is a characteristic of the event itself 
and is thus a characteristic of the interaction of the organism 
with the distal stimulus when the event in question is initiated 
by a stimulus. Thus it is possible for two organisms to react 
with equal psychological complexity to stimuli with very dif-
ferent distal stimulus complexity values. The same organism 
may also react with different degrees of psychological com-
plexity at different times to the same stimulus. (pp. 54-55) 
Walker offers a brief description of the (assumed) underlying 
nervous system basis of the experience of optimal complexity, under 
the heading "Neural Net or Neural Process Complexity": 
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Underlying any psychological event, is, of course, a pattern of 
neural events. Such events are spatially three dimensional and 
occur over a finite period of time, a fourth dimension. It is as-
sumed that variation can occur in the relative complexities of 
two neural processes. We shall refer to the relative complexity 
of a four-dimensional neural process as the relative complex-
ity of the relevant neural net. Furthermore, we shall assume 
a complete isomorphism between neural net complexity and 
psychological complexity (Walker, 1964, p. 55). 
He offers as relative characteristics of simple versus complex neu-
ral net in terms of the four dimensions noted above: "simple" nets 
consist of processes that are relatively "small," "short," "focal," and 
"central" (i.e., origin within the central nervous system); "complex" 
nets are relatively "large," "long," "diffuse," and "peripheral." 
Having offered a neurologically oriented substrate, Walker turns 
to the concept of psychological complexity itself. Under the heading 
"Optimal Complexity," he asserts: 
The key concept of the theory I am attempting to fabricate is the 
concept of optimal complexity. The simplest and most straight 
forward psychological definition of optimal complexity is the 
following: Optimal complexity is that degree of psychological com-
plexity the organism will seek to maintain. 
If a psychological event is more complex than the optimum, 
the organism will behave in such a manner as to reduce the 
complexity of the event. If a psychological event is less com-
plex than the optimum, then the organism will behave in such 
a manner as to increase the complexity of the event. 
Optimal complexity can be bracketed by other values of 
psychological complexity. In perception, an input level far above 
optimum produces "mental dazzle." A lower limit is a level of 
complexity that is below the threshold of consciousness. In mo-
tor activity, psychological complexity far above optimum re-
sults in discoordinated tetany, and there is a lower value which 
constitutes the threshold for action. The optimum is a "normal" 
percept or a smoothly coordinated movement. ... 
The sequence is inevitable and the fall in neural net com-
plexity is an automatic result of observable and fairly well un-
derstood neurophysiological characteristics. Since neural net 
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complexity and psychological complexity are assumed to be 
isomorphic, psychological complexity may be said to rise and 
fall as well. With a sufficiently complex stimulus, psychological 
complexity will rise to and exceed the threshold of conscious-
ness, will rise to and exceed optimal complexity, will fall be-
low optimal complexity, will then drop below the threshold of 
consciousness automatically, and will usually be followed by 
another psychological event. 
[The reader] will recall that the first of the three basic ques-
tions of behavior theory was: 
What is the mechanism which terminates an event? 
The answer is: 
Whether the stimulus for an event is continued or not, a psy-
chological event undergoes a sharp and automatic drop in com-
plexity during a period of approximately one-half second after 
its initiation. (Walker, 1964, pp. 56-58) 
With respect to repeated activation of an event, he asserts: 
Repeated activation of a neural net will result in a progressive de-
crease in the psychological complexity of the event involved. (p. 59) 
With respect to the second major question (What are the determi-
nants of the choice of the next event?), he continues: 
The principle of optimal complexity incorporates the dyna-
mism that the organism will seek such a level. The termination 
of one event occasioned by the automatic reduction in its psy-
chological complexity below the optimum level, literally forces 
choice of that event among available next events which will be 
nearest optimum. Therefore: 
Among available alternatives, an organism will choose as a next 
event that activity which is nearest optimal psychological complex-
ity. 
It is assumed as a working hypothesis that many of the 
major determinants of choice behavior such as reinforcement, 
habit, motivation, curiosity and other collative2 variables, sub-
jective probability and utility, and others ultimately can be re-
duced to a single concept-psychological complexity. (p. 60) 
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Walker offers a brief recapitulation: 
The theory can be stated in an abbreviated form. During the 
course of a psychological event that has a duration of approxi-
mately 500 [msec], the psychological complexity of the event 
rises abruptly and falls more slowly. The automatic reduction 
in the psychological complexity of an event insures that it will 
drop promptly below the optimum to be replaced by that one of 
the available alternative events which is nearest optimum. The 
psychological complexity of alternative behaviors or events 
will be a function of four variables. They are: (1) the stimulus 
complexity of the initiation stimulus; (2) the time since this par-
ticular event has occurred previously; (3) the number of times 
that event had occurred before; (4) the arousal properties of the 
stimulus or event. (Walker, 1964, p. 60) 
Walker addresses the issue of what behavior(s) might be expected 
when no near-optimum event is present. In the case of all available 
alternatives below optimum, an individual might commonly respond 
in one or more ways (slightly adapting Walker's text): 
1. Search the environment or his own repertory for more 
complex events; 
2. Find a more complex stimulus in the environment to 
which he had not attended previously, or he might fall 
to daydreaming; 
3. React by locomoting, getting up and moving about; 
4. Seek arousing stimuli; 
5. Seek to differentiate previously unexplored potential 
complexity in his environment or in old thought se-
quences and problems. 
All of these devices would serve to increase the complexity 
level of the sequences of events which are occurring. All would 
serve to move the sequence nearer an optimal level of complex-
ity. (Walker, 1964, p. 61) 
At the other extreme: 
Situations in which the psychological complexity levels are 
above optimum are usually situations in which the sensory in-
puts into the nervous system are providing more information 
than the organism can process. This may result when the exter-
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nal environment is too complex, when the problem one is work-
ing [on] is beyond immediate solution, or when the motivational 
or emotional system is in a highly aroused state. (pp. 61-62) 
In such circumstances, he notes common reactions: 
1. The organism may shift attention or narrow attention to a 
limited portion of the stimulus input; 
2. If the overload is of external origin, the organism may loco-
mote to a less complex circumstance; 
3. If either are difficult or impossible, the organism may attend 
repeatedly to the same stimulus in an effort, usually successful, 
to produce a reduction in the psychological complexity of the 
situation through repeated activation of the relevant event; 
4. An associated result of repeated activation is to organize a 
very complex stimulus into a smaller number of "chunks." 
(p.62) 
Walker's contribution concludes with a survey and critique of 
relevant research and theoretical distinctions to provide support for 
and elucidation of the conceptual framework adduced therein. He 
buttresses his concept by applying it to existing experimental data 
that are not easily explainable by any other existing theory. For ex-
ample, he applies his theory of optimal psychological complexity to 
the often-observed (but less frequently reported) decremental varia-
tions in "conditioned responses" following "learning" experiments 
that have been taken by many to be unexplainable anomalies. After 
noting a few such "anomalous" observations: 
For the sake of the argument I am certain to get, let me take the 
position that the appropriate "learning" curve shape in running 
studies, conditioning studies, and selective learning studies, is 
one that rises and falls to zero or to a steady level below the 
maximum performance. The curve that rises to a steady maxi-
mum and remains there indefinitely is likely to be rare. The 
reason that we see few "learning" curves of the postulated type 
is that most experimenters know in advance what a learning 
curve is supposed to look like. As a result of this knowledge, 
they stop training when the" asymptote" is reached, or, if they 
obtain a curve which does not fit their conception of what one 
should look like, they find a great many other ways to respond 
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... other than to publish their sin against respectability. They 
throwaway their data. They restructure the apparatus. They 
change the parameters of the study. They change the design. 
This process is known as the establishment of experimental(er) 
control. Sooner or later they manage a situation in which they 
obtain the "right" answer. I can attest that this process is carried 
out in good faith and under the assumption that in so doing, 
one is behaving like a sound, rigorous, and careful experimen-
talist. I can attest to this because I am one of the sinners. 
Thus psychological complexity theory handles the usual 
learning curve, extinction, and the drop in performance that of-
ten occurs under continued reinforcement. It predicts that most 
experimental situations will produce a drop in performance if 
training is continued. (Walker, 1964, pp. 85-86) 
In later comments concerning Walker's presentation, his fellow 
presenter, Frank Logan, in addition to suggesting caveats to the for-
mer's views, concludes with an important observation: 
There are several features of Walker's approach with which I am 
in strong agreement. A language that avoids the artificial separa-
tion of stimuli and responses more nearly captures the unified, 
interdependent inseparability of psychological events. It is also 
becoming increasingly recognized that the fundamental behav-
ioral operation of an organism is selection or choice .... Walker's 
attempt to develop a system that can deal with behavior dynam-
ically, i.e., continuously over time, is perhaps the critical feature 
necessary to achieve a general integration. And, by whatever 
means, visualizing such disparate concepts as habit, motivation, 
and decision-making in terms of a single construct certainly is 
one we should applaud. (Logan, 1964, p. 98) 
Robert Ward Leeper (1965) 
Robert Leeper's contribution, "Some needed developments in 
the motivational theory of emotions" (1965), is focused on urging 
greater attention to understanding emotions as motivational factors, 
rather than "lower," simply "energizing" or "arousing" factors that 
are then guided by "higher-order" functions (e.g., perception and/ 
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or cognition). In fact, Leeper highlights the ultimately inseparability 
of processes of perception, motivation, and emotion: 
Still earlier, David Krech (1949, 195Ga, 195Gb, 1951), in his 
usual impassioned style, had reasoned that it is unrealistic 
to conceive of psychological phenomena in terms of separate 
processes of perception, motivation and learning. Instead, he 
urged, we ought merely to conceive of "Dynamic Systems." 
These, he said, are so definitely organic unities that no single 
aspect of such a system can be changed without changing the 
other aspects as well-we have been dealing in myths in be-
lieving that we could vary some one of these aspects while 
keeping the other aspects constant. Though proposing a less 
drastic statement on this point, E. C. Tolman (1932, 1948) had 
been suggesting some perceptual factors in motivation in his 
view that motivation is partly a matter of reward expectations 
and punishment expectations. Kurt Lewin similarly had been 
discussing many problems of motivation in terms of factors in 
the organism's "psychological environment." ... In my own 
previous writing, my original paper on a motivational theory 
of emotion (1948) was extended to some extent into the per-
ceptual-motivational theory which has been elaborated in the 
present paper .... 
One odd fact about these various earlier discussions of a 
perceptual or conceptual interpretation of motivation is that 
their authors have made practically no references to the related 
ideas of the other papers. This is the more surprising in view of 
the fact that most of this group are more or less closely related 
to one another both personally and as regards their general the-
oretical outlooks and interests. It seems, therefore, as though 
each of these persons had to grope to the concept on his own, 
even though possibly helped in ways that he did not recog-
nize by his predecessors or colleagues. I make this suggestion 
with somewhat more confidence because I remember that, in 
my own case, when I first read Krech's papers on "Dynamic 
Systems," they did not make much sense for me .... And, pe-
culiarly, it took me a long time to recognize that Lewin's ideas 
might be thought of as a perceptual theory of emotion .... 
Maybe this sort of thing will continue to be the case. If a 
perceptual theory of motivation is to become more common, 
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perhaps each psychologist will have to figure it out for himself. 
(Leeper, 1965, pp. 111-112) 
Leeper summarizes some major themes: 
The suggestion that comes from a number of sources, therefore, 
is, first of all, that emotions are motives, and then, second, that 
emotional processes, along with all other motives, are percep-
tual or representational processes. The suggestion that comes is 
that emotions and other motives do not exist or operate in any 
less complex sense than this .... 
Even though perceptual habits are hard to change in some 
cases ... it seems that all perceptual habits can be modified by 
learning and that sometimes such modifications can occur sud-
denly and dramatically. If emotional habits are perceptual hab-
its, these same possibilities should exist for them. (pp. 113, 115) 
Theodore Newcomb (1953) 
Theodore Newcomb's contribution, to the very first volume of the 
Symposium, was "Motivation in social behavior" (1953). Newcomb 
makes clear that he does not believe that a psychology of motivation in 
social situations should be fundamentally different or discrepant from 
a general psychology of motivation. Rather, it should be subsumed by 
a broader model of motivation that describes human motivation in 
any situation. However, he also notes that the breadth of such an over-
arching model would not lend itself to making predictions or heighten 
understanding of specific processes or variables within a particular 
subdomain of psychology in general (e.g., individual behavior in a 
learning situation; behavior in a social situation): 
A general theory, whether of motivation or of evolution of spe-
cies, is never specific enough to predict within a specific area 
those details in which we are often most interested. Indeed, it 
is from the relatively limited theories that the relatively inclu-
sive theories must in the long run emerge. (Newcomb, 1953, p. 
139) 
The relevance of his contribution to the topic of self-organized sys-
tems is seen in his analysis of the dynamics or organization of com-
municative behavior in an interpersonal context. 
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Newcomb goes on to define terms and delimit his focus to com-
municative behavior between individuals: 
The properties of objects may be studied either objectively or 
phenomenally-preferably in both ways-but in any case, they 
are studied not as things-in-themselves, but as related to persons. 
Thus the characteristic way in which social psychologists study 
motivation is in terms of person-object relationships (the term 
"object" includes other persons, of course). Since, as we have all 
learned in recent years, motivational phenomena are intimately 
interlinked with perceptual phenomena, it is often necessary to 
distinguish two aspects of person-object relationships, which 
may be labeled the cathetic and the cognitive. Often, however, 
one does not need to make this distinction, while still bearing 
in mind that both aspects are involved, and in such instances 
the term "orientation" is a useful one. The term is similar to the 
concept of "attitude," except that it connotes "existing direct-
edness" and not merely a predisposition or a readiness. 
Orientations are known, of course, only as they are inferred 
from observable behavior. Insofar as such behavior involves 
reciprocal stimulation and response (or anticipations thereof) 
it is traditionally referred to as "interaction." But one cannot 
observe interaction-in-general; one must observe discriminable 
units of behavior. I propose, therefore, to use as such an in-
teraction unit the communicative act, defined as any observable 
behavior by which information, consisting of discriminative 
stimuli, is transmitted from a human source to a human recipi-
ent. For present purposes, it is assumed that the discriminative 
stimuli have an object as referent. Thus in the simplest possible 
communicative act, one person (A) transmits information to 
another person (B) about something (X). 
Human social behavior is thus to be studied in terms of 
the conditions and consequences of varying communicative 
acts. And problems of motivation in social behavior are to be 
studied in terms of orientations toward the two kinds of ob-
jects necessarily involved in communicative acts-i.e., persons 
as recipients of transmitted information and objects (including 
persons) as referents of transmitted information. The relationship 
between orientations and communicative acts, as we shall see, is a 
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circular one, so that it will be necessary to consider each of them, 
in turn, as varying with the other [emphasis added]. (Newcomb, 
1953, pp. 140-141) 
Following a second section summarizing relevant findings con-
cerning group membership, orientations, and communication, New-
comb moves to a section titled "Communicative Behavior as Varying 
with Orientation toward Persons and toward Objects." In this section 
he explicates the systemic relations between communicative acts and 
the orientations of individuals in a communication setting: 
I can hardly imagine anything that would surprise you less 
than to hear that communicative acts are learned in ways that 
seem to have something to do with rewards and punishments. 
I shall stop, however, only to indicate in the most general kind 
of way what seems to be the nature of the learning conditions 
of communicative behavior. These conditions have to do with 
what I have already referred to as the individual's necessity 
for co-orientation-i.e., relating himself simultaneously both to 
objects and to persons as actually or potentially related to those 
objects .... 
We may start with the assumption that orientations both 
toward persons as potential co-communicators and toward 
other objects have adaptive value; not to be oriented to them 
would mean to have no cognitive content regarding them and 
to have no "hypotheses" (in the Postman-Bruner sense) as to 
their potentialities for reward or punishment. The further as-
sumption that co-orientation has adaptive value stems from 
what I believe to be the fact that neither kind of orientation oc-
curs singly and independently of the other, in connection with 
communicative acts. First, the orientation of any communica-
tor, A, toward B, a potential recipient of his communication, 
rarely, if ever, occurs in an objectless vacuum .... 
Secondly, and conversely, the orientation of the communi-
cator, A, toward almost any conceivable X rarely, if ever, occurs 
in the total absence of an orientation toward B, the potential 
recipient of his communication. ("Autistic" verbalization, of 
the kind Pia get reports in young children, would, of course, 
represent an exception ... ). The very fact that B is a potential 
recipient requires some kind of orientation toward him .... AI-
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most invariably, moreover, there is included in this orientation 
toward B some assumption-however accurate or inaccurate-
about B's orientation toward the object of communication. 
From this elaboration of what is perhaps only too obvious, 
I want to deduce a single point-that there is a necessary inter-
dependence between co-orientation (which itself involves an 
interdependence of orientations) and communicative acts .... 
Since, according to these assumptions, there are relation-
ships of interdependence among several distinguishable orien-
tations, it is convenient to regard them as together constituting 
a system. For some purposes the system is best treated as an 
objective one-i.e., a model employed by the observer. The ele-
ments in this system are, minimally, A, B and X (a source, a 
recipient and an object of communication); the interdependent 
orientations among them are A's toward B and toward X, and 
B's toward A and toward X .... 
The implications of this model are: (1) that while at any 
given moment the system may be conceived of as being "at 
rest," it is characterized not by the absence but by the balance of 
forces; and (2) that a change in any part of the system may lead 
to changes in any of the others. I shall make one further set of 
assumptions about the system .... These assumptions are that 
(under the stated conditions) communication tends to result in 
increased similarity, or congruence, of A's and B's orientations 
toward X, and that, as a result of learning, communicative acts 
are instigated by the anticipation of increased similarity or con-
gruence (or, alternatively, by the threat of decreased similarity 
or congruence). (Newcomb, 1953, pp. 147-149) 
After positing adaptive advantages of his concept of congruence, he 
goes on to articulate an important aspect of his" A-B-X" system, 
which he considers a "strain toward congruence" (p. 149). 
The systemic perspective of Newcomb's contribution and his 
initial observations of the relation between explanations/models at 
the level of subareas of psychology concludes with a view to the fu-
ture: 
I should like to suggest (with a good deal of tentativeness) 
that something along the lines of the framework of co-orien-
tation which I have roughly sketched out may find a place in 
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general motivation theory. Many, among the higher forms of 
animal life, at least, are capable of plural orientation, and the 
actual direction of behavior at any given moment often cannot 
be accounted for in terms of any single object-orientation, oth-
ers being held experimentally or hypothetically constant. ... I 
suspect that the study of social behavior can provide evidence, 
in ways other behavior cannot, of how behavior directedness 
varies with multiple orientations. If so, an adequate theory of 
motivated social behavior will have contributed something to 
a general theory. 
Last, and far from least, an adequate general theory would 
take fuller account than it does today of self-orientation .... 
Here, as in the case of other concepts of peculiar relevance to 
social motivation, it is my belief that more extrapolations from 
a general theory will not suffice. Theorists from McDougall 
and Freud to Murphy and Rogers have properly accorded to 
the self a central place; though not always, in my judgment, 
have all of them seen that place in its full social context. Not 
only are self-orientations part and parcel of other-orientations, 
I would insist; they are inextricable from the eternal triangle 
of self, other persons, and the common environment. A gen-
eral theory of motivation, when it is mature enough to include 
these interdependent orientations, will have borrowed from a 
theory of motivation in social behavior, as well as helping to 
establish it. (Newcomb, 1953, p. 159) 
Roger Barker (1960) 
Roger Barker's contribution, "Ecology and motivation" (1960), in-
cludes an account of alteration of individual state(s) as a function 
of external, higher-order patterns or change. Like Heider and New-
comb, Barker underscores the necessity of taking individual and en-
vironment into account as a unit in any thorough analysis of behav-
ior, and, hence, his contribution advances themes consistent with the 
conceptual frameworks advanced at the 2004 Symposium. Barker's 
conceptual framework is like that of Heider (1960) and Kurt Lewin's 
concepts of field and life space (Lewin, 1938). This provides an intel-
lectual context in which to consider the importance of taking both in-
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dividual and environment into account. At a practical level, this res-
onates with major themes in rehabilitation, for example, the World 
Health Organization's recent emphasis on the construct participation 
as the ultimate aim of rehabilitation efforts (see World Health Or-
ganization, 2001). This construct is of importance because it under-
scores the importance of including assessment and modification of 
an environment, in addition to clinical treatment, as a vital part of the 
rehabilitation process. 
Barker outlines features of his concept of psychological ecology, 
including the central concept of behavior settings, which provides an 
important window on our understanding of a range of psychologi-
cal phenomena as a "system" and is, at times, a very useful unit of 
analysis for psychology. The relevance of Barker's concepts for the 
issues addressed in the present volume is that, like Newcomb (1953), 
Barker describes a framework that explicitly relates systems concepts 
to adaptive processes at the social! community level. 
Barker begins by incorporating from the work of Egon Brunswik 
an emphasis on the critical importance of including in accounts of 
perception and behavior the environment in which an individual 
acts and perceives. In Barker's words: 
Brunswik (1955) described psychological schools and theories 
in terms of their positions upon a macro-unit he considered to 
be the true vein of psychological ore. This vein extends from 
the environment to the environment; namely, from distal ob-
jects in the ecological environment, through proximal stimuli 
at the receptor surfaces of a person, through the person's pe-
ripheral receptor mechanisms, through his central processes, 
and through his peripheral effector systems, to his proximal 
reactions, or means behavior; and it finally terminates in the 
focus of the total unit: the person's achievement with respect to 
the nonpsychological world of things. The three major sectors 
of this unit are ... (1) the ecological sector of objects and physi-
cal stimuli (preperceptual), (2) the organism or intrapersonal 
sector, and (3) the behavioral sector which occurs, again, in the 
ecological environment. (Barker, 1960, p. 1) 
Barker, along with Brunswik, regards the entire span of the E-E 
(environment-environment) unit as the fundamental unit of analy-
sis with respect to psychology; it is "the basic psychological entity." 
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He takes issue with some of Brunswik's conclusions, advancing the 
hope that taking the entire E-E span into account can lead to more 
than a probabilistic framework for psychological explanations: 
I hold the hope that a more detailed, conceptual, and explana-
tory account of the whole course of events can be achieved, 
particularly at the junction point between the ecological and 
the intrapersonal sectors of the unit, and especially with respect 
to motivation. This, in fact, is the theme of my paper. (Barker, 
1960, p. 3) 
The E-E unit, then, is to be taken as the ultimate unit of analysis; 
one obvious way to understand this unit is as a multisectored system. 
As can be seen in the material reproduced below, one theme that 
recurs in other examples of systems approaches is that of the close 
relation between the processes of change, perception, and motiva-
tion. A second major theme is the influence of changes or properties 
in one part of the system on the qualitative status of other parts of 
the system, a defining aspect of all exemplars of models informed by 
general systems theory. Finally, the interaction of sectors of the E-E 
unit is considered with respect to emergent social aspects in Barker's 
system: 
For a psychology defined in terms of E-E units, the usual con-
siderations of motivation are not adequate. These consider-
ations almost always make personal motives the whole story 
of the energetics of behavior, and place them within the organ-
ism. But a unit is a unit; it is indivisible. When it is a psycho-
logical unit, the environment, the organism, and the behavior 
are all involved, and energetics must occur in all of the parts. 
Either the E-E unit is false, or motivation theory is too limited. 
(Barker, 1960, p. 4) 
Barker goes on to lay the groundwork for discussion of his the-
ory of behavior settings by introducing some concepts that provide 
the context for his central theses. In a later section he provides fur-
ther elucidation of the relation between the "entity" and the "envi-
ronment" elements of his model: 
Ecology is concerned with relations between entity and envi-
ronment. But before this statement has any useful meaning, 
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entity and environment must be defined .... Where does each 
entity end and its environment begin? .. . 
. . . To clarify this problem, it is necessary to revert to the 
levels of phenomena in science .... I have emphasized that the 
essential distinction between levels is this: The laws, the expla-
nations, which have been devised to account for occurrences 
on one level are inadequate to explain occurrences on a differ-
ent level, yet the levels are coupled systems. Another distinction 
that is crucial for the definition of environment is that between 
inside and outside. Every entity has a discriminable boundary; 
what is within the boundary constitutes the entity's inside, and 
what is without constitutes its outside .... The environment of 
an entity is made up of those parts of the outside regions with 
which the entity is coupled by laws on a different level from 
those which govern the entity itself . 
. . . Here, for ecological problems, is the basis for delimiting 
an entity from its environment. The test is this: As we move 
from any discriminable thing to more remote, surrounding 
parts, a point is reached at which the governing laws, so far 
as we know them, become incommensurate, yet the linkage 
remains. This point marks the boundary of the entity and the 
beginning of the environment. (Barker, 1960, pp. 7-8) 
Barker asserts the desirability of taking the entire E-E continuum 
as the crucial unit of analysis, rather than abstracting only elements 
of it for psychological examination. He offers the study of psycho-
logical principles of learning as an example: 
The field of learning is interesting in this connection. Learning 
is usually interpreted as the process, par excellence, by which 
the environment influences the organism and its behavior. This 
is the predominant way, almost the only way, a culture is pre-
sumed to shape the personality and behavior of the individu-
als born into it. The facts of learning demonstrate, however, 
as almost all learning theory recognizes, that even here the 
organism is the locus of driving forces without which learn-
ing does not occur. Indeed, within the context of learning it 
is, paradoxically, the behaving organism that endows the en-
vironment with behavior-controlling properties; the guiding 
and coercing powers of the environment have been shown to 
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depend upon what activities the organism has previously had 
with it, and these depend more upon the organism than upon 
the environment. Indeed, learning studies have demonstrated 
that almost every discriminable part of the ecological environ-
ment can be coupled with almost every kind of behavior. This 
is important information; it defines the range of an organism's 
power to transform its connections with the ecological environ-
ment, and it implies that parts of the environment are almost 
equipotential. ... 
It will be clear now where ecology enters the environ-
ment-environment unit, which Brunswik took as the realm of 
psychology. Psychological ecology deals with the relations be-
tween the nonpsychological sectors of this unit, governed by 
the laws of geometry, chemistry, economics, etc., and the intra-
personal and the behavior sectors, governed by psychological 
laws. (Barker, 1960, pp. 11-12) 
He then attempts to formulate an account of how these incommen-
surable system elements might be related (or, at least, an approach 
to a satisfactory understanding) by exploring earlier ideas of Fritz 
Heider's. 
Barker makes a gradual transition to his concept of behavior 
settings. Because these ideas are readily available to the interested 
reader, a detailed presentation will not be offered here. However, 
one would highlight a particularly important element of his con-
cepts concerning behavior settings: Barker highlights how behavior 
settings are regions in a community that offer certain opportunities 
and, along with these, require certain responsibilities. Furthermore, 
there is a relation between the peopling of these settings and both 
the number of responsibilities and the adequacy of performance that 
can be expected to occur. This relation between the demands of a 
given behavior setting and the impact on the behavior and life of the 
individuals populating these settings seems very compatible with 
more recent concepts. 
Implications for the analysis of complex settings and behavior 
are evident. Barker continues, in a section entitled "Theory of Behav-
ior Settings": 
Field studies in which I and my associates have been en-
gaged, of the behavior of children in their natural habitats, 
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have brought us to the hypothesis that under certain precisely 
defined and frequently occurring conditions, people stand in 
the relationship of media to behavior settings; and that under 
certain other less common conditions, people stand in the re-
lationship of things to behavior settings, imposing certain ab-
solute constraints on them. This hypothesis brings some order 
into data upon American-English differences in the behavior of 
children and adults, into data upon differences in the behavior 
of individuals in settings of different sizes, and into data con-
cerning the behavioral consequences of physical disability. The 
wide ramifications of these simple ideas suggest that they may 
have a basic significance for psychology, and particularly for 
the psychology of motivation .... 
It is first necessary to describe behavior settings. When a 
mother writes, "There is a baseball game in progress on the play-
ground across the street," she does not refer to any individual's 
behavior, but to the behavior of children en masse. The same is 
true of a newspaper item which reports, "The annual fete held 
in the St. Ambrose Church garden was a great success." 
These are behavior settings. They are highly visible behav-
ior phenomena; laymen mention them in conversation and in 
writing as frequently as they do individual persons .... Here 
are ... [some] behavior settings: 
Streets and sidewalks 
Kane's Grocery 
Clifford's Drug Store 
Gwyn Cafe 
Pearl Cafe 
Midwest State Bank 
Of special relevance in the present connection, however, 
are the following characteristics of settings: 
1. Behavior settings involve ongoing patterns of extraindivid-
ual behavior whose identity and functioning are indepen-
dent of the participation of particular persons. 
2. A behavior setting has a circumjacent soma of physical ob-
jects: of walls, doors, fences, chairs, dishes, typewriters, ad 
infinitum, arranged in a characteristic spatial pattern, at a 
particular temporal and physical locus. 
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3. Behavior settings are homeostatic systems; they normally 
persist, often for years, at a relatively stable, characteristic 
level. ... 
A behavior setting is a behavior entity, but its laws of op-
eration are not the laws of individual psychology ... 
Most of what we know about behavior settings is simple 
description, with any conceptualizations being not far re-
moved from the surface appearance of settings. However, this 
is enough to make a beginning in tracing the connections along 
the Brunswikian unit which has its origins in this part of the 
ecological environment. For our purposes, the self-regulatory 
characteristic of behavior settings is crucial and must be con-
sidered further; it is this, indeed, which gives behavior settings, 
under certain conditions, the position of things which impose 
their own patterns on the people within them, who have the 
position of media. 
Behavior settings exhibit a stability-within-change, a per-
sisting functional level which is due to a balance of many influ-
ences. Some of these issue from the larger community, some 
are intrinsic to the setting itself, and some originate within the 
individuals who populate the setting ... 
. . . Forces operate in every setting. These multiple balanced 
forces assure that the level of a setting is more stable than most 
of its parts or conditions singly. One frequently occurring means 
of balancing the forces and maintaining the homeostatic level of 
a behavior setting is compensating for a deficiency in the num-
ber or docility of the parts of the medium by an increase in the 
amount of energy applied to each of them, and vice versa. When 
the media of a setting, the machinery, the tools, or the workmen, 
for example, are in short supply, those available have to work 
longer and/ or "harder." (Barker, 1960, pp. 15-21) 
In the last section of his contribution, Barker discusses "People: 
Media of Behavior Settings": 
Six features of the relationship between people and behavior 
settings must now be mentioned. 
1. People are part of the inside manifold of behavior settings. 
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2. Of all the attributes of settings, people are the sine qua non .... 
3. Each quasi-stationary level of a setting has its optimal popu-
lation requirements .... 
4. Of all the equipment and paraphernalia of a setting, people 
are among the most immediately malleable and adjustable. 
5. Different behavior settings on the same level of functioning, 
and therefore with the same optimal population require-
ments, actually differ greatly in population .... 
6. These five features of the relation between people and be-
havior settings emphasize the position of people as the me-
dia of behavior settings. This is true. However, there is one 
important exception. When the number of people in a set-
ting, its population, falls below the minimal number re-
quired by its homeostatic level, the setting will be modified. 
(Barker, 1960, pp. 21-22) 
He concludes: 
Behavior settings with less than optimal people for their ho-
meostatic levels are self-disciplining settings. The opportuni-
ties within them are matched by the obligations they contain . 
. . . We sometimes call them self-discipline. In reality they are 
controls built into the structure and the dynamics of the setting, 
into the ecological environment. ... 
I would like to close with two remarks: (1) Brunswik's 
environment-environment unit appears to be subject to more 
than empirical probabilistic laws, and (2) the ecological envi-
ronment appears to be, especially, the seat of motivating influ-
ences. (pp. 48-49) 
Barker's contribution-as is his body of scholarly work in gen-
eral-is novel and interesting and would seem to have continuing 
applications today. In particular, the growing acknowledgment that 
community reintegration and quality of life are vitally important 
ends of rehabilitation efforts and that rehabilitation cannot really be 
considered a successful endeavor unless an individual is supported 
to the point of maximal participation in the life of the community, 
with the greatest degree of independence possible, leads inevitably 
to the recognition that there must be a satisfactory awareness of the 
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environment-the behavior settings and social/interpersonal envi-
ronment to which an individual will be returning-before an opti-
mal rehabilitation treatment plan can be developed and delivered. 
Barker's (and his students') techniques for identifying and catalog-
ing community venues can serve as a guide in expanding rehabili-
tation practice to include such analyses. In this regard, in addition 
to Barker's work and the models of Brunswik and Heider (already 
referenced), additional useful resources include Gibson (1979) and 
Wicker (1984). 
Notes 
The editors would like to acknowledge and express a special thanks to Mr. 
Joe Brown for his superlative work as copy editor of this volume of the Ne-
braska Symposium on Motivation. Mr. Brown's consistently resourceful and 
creative suggestions concerning the substance, organization, and presenta-
tion of chapter materials contributed immeasurably to the clarity and co-
herence of the final product. As will be evident, the conceptual breadth of 
material and diversity of perspectives reflected in this volume are consider-
able. Mr. Brown's timely and precise questions and observations, clear and 
patient counsel, and unflagging good humor throughout were notably cata-
lytic in successfully bringing the 52nd edition of the symposium together in 
its present form. All volume editors should be so fortunate! 
1. Compare Theodore Newcomb's" A-B-X" model, discussed below. 
2. Variables such as curiosity, novelty, and stimulus change, stimulus as-
pects sometimes thought to provoke increased engagement, interest, and/ or 
increase arousal. 
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